Add to ORKGA mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotation both before and after it is played. We ask the following three related questions: (1) what kind of environments or mechanism design problems admit renegotiation-proof implementation? (2) what kind of social choice rules are implementable in a way that is renegotiation-proof? and (3) what kind of mechanisms are renegotiation-proof? We provide characterization results for environments, social choice rules, and mech-anisms that facilitate renegotiation-proof implementation in complete information set-tings, and in incomplete information settings with independent private values. For incomplete information settings with correlated interdependent values we provide ...
In situations in which the social planner has to make several decisions over time, before agents hav...
Cooperation in repeated games relies on the possibility that equilibrium play following some t -peri...
We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate...
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotation both before and a...
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotation both before and a...
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotiation both before and ...
We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information,...
According to standard theory, the set of implementable outcome functions is reduced if the mechanism...
According to standard theory, the set of implementable efficient outcome functions is greatly reduce...
We characterize decision rules which are implementable in mechanism design settings when, after the ...
This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in setting of comp...
The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanism whose equilibrium ou...
This paper studies Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among ...
The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999), in which tw...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
In situations in which the social planner has to make several decisions over time, before agents hav...
Cooperation in repeated games relies on the possibility that equilibrium play following some t -peri...
We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate...
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotation both before and a...
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotation both before and a...
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotiation both before and ...
We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information,...
According to standard theory, the set of implementable outcome functions is reduced if the mechanism...
According to standard theory, the set of implementable efficient outcome functions is greatly reduce...
We characterize decision rules which are implementable in mechanism design settings when, after the ...
This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in setting of comp...
The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanism whose equilibrium ou...
This paper studies Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among ...
The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999), in which tw...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
In situations in which the social planner has to make several decisions over time, before agents hav...
Cooperation in repeated games relies on the possibility that equilibrium play following some t -peri...
We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate...